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For the most part, the literature about Indonesia’s foreign policy does not stray far from a descriptive 
and chronological presentation of the subject. The fact of the matter is that an in-depth analysis of the nation’s 
foreign policy from a different era will impart valuable lessons to the current policymakers in charge of  
formulating and implementing such a policy. The era of Sukarno bore witness to the implementation of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy that was strong in ideas and practices. Employing discourse analysis, this article 
seeks to analyze five of Sukarno’s speeches, which were delivered in various international forums from 1955 to 
1963. During that time, Indonesia put forward a coherent and consistent foreign policy with colonialism as its 
master signifier. The promotion of such a discourse contributed positively to the diplomatic effort on the issue of 
West Papua by mobilizing supports from Asian-African nations, as well as attracting the interest of the 
superpowers. As a result, Indonesia’s national interest to bring West Papua into the Republic was well served, 
and furthermore, Indonesia succeeded in enhancing its image, role, and leadership in world affairs. This 
experience presents a challenge to the contemporary policymakers in producing a configuration of strong ideas 
and concepts that would allow the implementation of a foreign policy that serves the national interest, when the 
nation has once again risen as an important player on international affairs. 
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ABSTRAK 
Tidak banyak literatur kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia (KLNI) yang menyajikan lebih dari sekedar 
paparan deskriptif dan kronologis. Padahal, analisis mendalam akan pelaksanaan kebijakan luar negeri di 
berbagai era mampu memberikan berbagai pelajaran berharga terlebih bagi para pelaksana kebijakan kini. Era 
Sukarno menjadi saksi atas pelaksanaan KLNI yang kuat pada tataran gagasan dan praktis. Dengan metode 
analisis diskursus, tulisan ini menganalisis lima pidato Sukarno di berbagai forum internasional dalam kurun 
waktu 1955 – 1963. Tulisan ini menemukan bahwa saat itu, Indonesia muncul dengan diskursus kebijakan luar 
negeri yang koheren dan konsisten dengan kolonialisme sebagai master signifier. Promosi diskursus tersebut 
berkontribusi positif pada usaha diplomasi Irian Barat melalui dukungan solidaritas Asia-Afrika dan tertariknya 
negara-negara adidaya untuk terlibat. Sebagai akibatnya, kepentingan nasional atas kembalinya Irian Barat 
terlayani dengan baik dan lebih dari itu, Indonesia berhasil meningkatkan citra, peran dan kepemimpinannya 
dalam urusan-urusan dunia. Pengalaman tersebut menjadi tantangan bagi para pengambil kebijakan di era 
kontemporer untuk mampu menghasilkan suatu konfigurasi ide dan gagasan yang kuat demi membuat 
pelaksanaan kebijakan luar negeri yang mampu melayani kepentingan nasional dengan baik di saat Indonesia 
sekali lagi muncul sebagai aktor penting dalam panggung internasional. 
 













The mid 1950s was an important 
milestone with regard to Sukarno’s domination 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy processes. 1 
Sukarno gradually stepped away from the 
constitutional boundaries of liberal democracy 
and became a central figure in the nation’s 
diplomacy after consolidating his political 
power in domestic affairs. The country’s 
foreign policy was then strongly embodied in 
his persona and presence in various 
international forums and events. 
Under Sukarno’s leadership, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy conduct was 
characterized by a strong anti-colonialism 
sentiment. 2 Demonstrating such an attitude 
towards colonialism through the country’s 
diplomacy was perceived as the action that 
perfectly embodied the national ideology.3 The 
nation’s foreign policy conduct with its thick 
anti-colonialism nuances was then presented 
with some focused policies, one of which was 
the struggle to gain sovereignty over West 
Papua. For John Reinhardt, this anti- 
colonialism view in the country’s foreign 
policy had substantially contributed to 
Indonesia’s, and especially Sukarno’s, growing 
importance in the international stage as the 
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This article maintains that Indonesia’s 
increasing role and leadership in the world 
stage were deliberate and intentional. This 
view is adopted by the post-structuralism in 
International Relations. This school of thought 
proposes a notion that the reality of 
international politics is constructed rather than 
given. Meanwhile, power is the element that 
defines the reality of international politics.5 It 
can be said that the interpretation of a 
particular terminology or event at international 
level is not done without some underlying 
power political interests. As such, the post- 
structuralists focus on the efforts to unveil the 
interests within power politics that provides a 
shape to an international event; and how words 
are used to narrate the event, thus enabling the 
narrative to contribute positively to the 
interests. 
In light of such an understanding, and 
by employing a method of discourse analysis6, 
this paper endeavors to map out how the 
various ideas about the reality of international 
politics are narrated and promoted in 
international forums as part of a strategy in 
diplomacy. 7 This paper analyzes five of 
Sukarno’s speeches derived from the collection 
of Indonesian National Archives (Arsip 
Nasional Republik Indonesia). These speeches 
were delivered in five international forums 
within the period from 1955 to 1961. The first 
was the opening address to the 1955 Asia- 
Africa Conference (AAC) in Bandung, 
Indonesia. The second was the “To Build the 
World Anew”, which was delivered before the 
15th session of United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 1960. Next was  a 
speech entitled “For Liberty and Justice”, 
which was delivered before The Council for 
World Affairs in Los Angeles, April 1961. 
 
5 Richard Devetak, Post-Structuralism. In S. 
Burchill and A. Linklater (Eds.). Theories of 
International Relations. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009. 
6 J.P. Gee, An introduction to discourse analysis: 
theory & method. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
7 Walter Carlsnaes, Foreign Policy. In Walter 
Carlsnaes, et. al. (Eds.). Handbook of International 
Relations. London: SAGE Publications, 2002. 
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Then it was followed by a speech delivered 
before The Asia-Africa Solidarity Council in 
Bandung, April 1961, and finally, it was the 
speech delivered at the inaugural summit of the 
Non-Alignment Movement in Belgrade, 
September 1961. 
Examining these speeches, this article 
attempts to illustrate the importance of a 
coherent and consistent discourse in supporting 
the implementation of a nation’s foreign policy 
to benefit the national interests. This article 
contends that at that time, Indonesia emerged 
as a powerful international actor in terms of the 
ideas it proposed and was quite an expert in 
managing the strategy to deal with the 
dynamics of international relations. As a result, 
the national interest to return the territory of 
West Papua to the Republic of Indonesia was 
well served and more than that, Indonesia 
succeeded in enhancing its image, role, and 
leadership in the world affairs. 
This article has been divided into four 
parts. The first part maps out Indonesia’s then 
foreign policy discourse. I shall show that the 
establishment of Asia-Africa solidarity and the 
internationalization of the issue of West Papua 
were the two main objectives of Sukarno’s 
efforts to promote such a foreign policy 
discourse. These objectives were achieved by 
placing the term of colonialism as the master 
signifier and setting aside the issues pertaining 
to the Cold War, which was then the dominant 
reality in international politics. 
The second section outlines the 
mapping of the foreign policy discourse by 
reviewing secondary data on the Indonesia’s 
West Irian diplomacy. This article argues that 
the promotion of a mapped discourse provided 
a positive contribution to the diplomatic efforts 
on West Irian through the support of Asian- 
African nations and the involvement of both 
the US and the Soviet Union. The third section 
shows that efforts at the level of ideas and 
practices provide positive contribution to the 
national interests. In the final section, this 
article presents its conclusion, reflecting the 
findings with regard to Indonesia’s current 
foreign policy conduct. 
 
 
Colonialism as a Master Signifier and Asia- 
Africa Solidarity in Indonesia’s Foreign 
Policy Discourse (1955-1963) 
 
“Then, I beg you not to think about 
colonialism only in the classical 
form, as it is known by the 
Indonesians and also by our 
brothers and sisters from various 
parts of Asia and Africa. 
Colonialism also has its modern 
form, namely in the form of 
economic control, intellectual 
control, and direct physical control 
by a small group of foreigners in a 
nation. It [colonialism] is a very 
skilled and persistent enemy and it 
[colonialism] appears in various 
forms. It [colonialism] does not 
give up easily.  Wherever, 
whenever, and however they 
appear, colonialism is an evil 
thing, and must be eliminated from 
the face of the earth.” 
Sukarno, 18 April 1955. 
 
The above excerpt is taken from the text 
of Sukarno’s speech when he opened the Asia- 
Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955. 
Through this single paragraph, Sukarno 
brought about a series of things that were 
related to the formation of a discourse. It was 
an important move on his part to create a 
coherent, consistent, and long-lasting foreign 
policy, which was actively promoted 
throughout the era of his administration as the 
first Indonesian president. 
It can be said that the most important 
thing that provides a significant contribution to 
the discourse is the placement of  colonialism 
as the master signifier. This word has more 
than enough capital to carry out such a role 
because it is placed on top of a strong historical 
foundation. In the above speech, Sukarno 
emphasized that as a formerly colonized 
nation, Indonesia, like many other Asian and 
African nations, knew what colonialism was all 
about. Using such a discursive means, Sukarno 
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proclaimed himself as the authoritative source 
to talk about colonialism, and thus, the 
legitimate leader of the newly independent 
countries. 
Nonetheless, Sukarno did not deny that 
those Asian and African nations were exposed 
to different forms and shapes of colonialism. 
Therefore, to maximize its impact, the very 
meaning and use of the word colonialism were 
restricted to a context specifically built for that 
purpose. To do that, as shown in the excerpt 
above, Sukarno was deliberately constricting 
the definition of colonialism into three simple 
points, i.e. colonialism is a form of economic 
control, intellectual control, and physical 
control exerted by a small group of foreigners 
within a territory of a nation. The 
simplification of the definition was crucial in 
determining the coverage of the produced 
discourse, in the sense to what extent the 
meaning of colonialism was used in the 
discourse. 
In addition to limiting its meaning, the 
roles of colonialism in the dynamics of 
international relations were also restricted. In 
the analyzed speeches, colonialism was mainly 
referred to as “a source of tension or dispute”, 
“a great and growing threat against peace.” 
Attaching such attributes to colonialism was a 
way to bring colonialism into a head-on 
collision with the concept of sovereignty. 
How Sukarno assigned a meaning to 
the concept can be found in his New York 
speech. For him, sovereignty means that 
nations must have the same and equal positions 
when it comes to international affairs. At the 
heart of this concept, as he further conveyed, is 
the basic right of every nation to determine its 
own destiny. In this context,  colonialism can 
be seen as an infringement of the sovereignty 
of every nation in the world, and thus a source 
of threat to world peace. As such, colonialism 
is the common enemy of sovereign states 
because it violates the most fundamental 
principle of relation between states. 
Sukarno saw that “colonialism is not 
yet dead” because “there are still numerous 
regions in Asia and Africa that have not gained 
independence yet.” Based on this, he proposed 
an action-oriented motion that had an objective 
to eliminate colonialism from the face of the 
earth. He also emphasized the “need to work 
together” to achieve this goal. One question 
then emerged regarding to who should take this 
collective action. Sukarno believed that the 
answer to such a question is the Asian and 
African nations that were either the colonized 
nations or the newly independent ones. As 
such, what was central to his speeches was the 
narratives to nurture a form of  solidarity 
among those nations. In one of his speeches, he 
even emphasized that he “spoke on behalf of 
[his] brothers in Asia and Africa”. In making 
this claim, he represented himself as the leader 
of Asian and African nations, aiming to end 
colonialism. 
In the analyzed speeches, some 
discursive means were apparently being used 
to ensure these speeches' positive contribution 
to Sukarno's efforts in fostering Asian-African 
solidarity. Firstly, the words “Asia” and 
“Africa” were placed side by side or referred to 
as a union as in “Asia-Africa.” Second, 
Sukarno used the pronouns “we” and “us” 
when referring to Asian-African nations in the 
presence of other nations in international 
forums. Third, he was translating the unity of 
Asia-Africa based on the shared experiences as 
formerly colonized nations. Fourth, he 
highlighted the distinctiveness of Asian- 
African identity as the “Third Bloc” that did 
not stand behind both “the Thomas Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence” (the Western 
Bloc) and “the Communist Manifesto of Karl 
Marx” (the Eastern Bloc). 
The use of these four discursive means 
brings about the emergence of the binary 
narrative of “us versus them.” Whereas the 
shared experience of being formerly colonized 
nations is the key component of the in-group 
identity, the credential as colonial powers 
determines who belongs to the out-group. In 
this regard, Sukarno included Western 
countries to the out-group as he was convinced 
that “colonialism is the fruit of the Western 
system.” Such a created binary opposition 
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further underlies a call for Asian-African 
nations to join a “collective struggle” against 
colonialism, and thus, the West. 
In this speech, Sukarno also argued 
that the joint efforts to oppose colonialism was 
a “historical inevitability” (keniscayaan 
sejarah). Based on this, the meaning of anti- 
colonialism struggle in the foreign policy 
discourse of Sukarno’s Indonesia had been 
fixed. It was regarded as something that would 
surely occur and could not be impeded, as well 
as something that was always “justified and 
right.” As Sukarno said, “Move with the flow 
of history; do not try to stem the current” 
(bergeraklah bersama arusnya sejarah; 
janganlah mencoba membendung arus itu). 
These views provided the necessary pretexts 
for and even strengthened the antagonism 
between formerly colonized nations and the 
Western countries. Moreover, it eventually 
contributed to the efforts to bring together and 
consolidate the Asian-African solidarity. 
The configuration and linkage of the 
aforementioned concepts and ideas had made 
Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse built by 
Sukarno emerge as an alternative way to think 
about international politics of his era. As far as 
the source of threat to international stability 
was concerned, he pointed to neither the 
heightened tension created by the nuclear arms 
race nor the competition between the Eastern 
and Western Blocs to expand their sphere of 
influence. As he stated in his New York 
speech, “Talking about disarmament is indeed 
good. However, let us be realistic, even an 
implementation of a disarmament agreement 
will not be a guarantee for peace on Earth.” In 
this context, it appears that Sukarno did not 
subscribe to the international reality of the 
Cold War. He instead opted for building his 
own version of reality in which the practice of 
colonialism was regarded as the root of tension 
among states. As he reiterated in Belgrade, the 
source of international tension and strife was 
not an “ideological conflict between the 
superpowers”, but an attempt by the colonial 
powers to subjugate and prevent colonized 
nations from gaining their full independence. 
Within the context of this alternative 
discourse, the dispute between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands on West Irian gained more 
prominence, thanks to the discursive means 
that linked this issue with colonialism as the 
discourse’s master signifier. The issue was not 
represented merely as territorial disputes 
between both countries. It was rather portrayed 
as an obvious manifestation of how one 
colonial power relentlessly sought to carry out 
the practice of colonialism by undermining 
another nation’s independence. Speaking in 
New York on the subject, Sukarno said that in 
West Irian, Indonesia saw how “a colonial 
sword was thrust to [the country].” Then in Los 
Angeles, he said something similar, where he 
stressed the significance of West Irian to the 
nation, “At present, West Irian–one fifth of our 
national territory–is still under colonialism.” 
Since the issue of West Irian stemmed 
from colonialism, which was seen as  the 
source of threat to the world peace, the issue 
could not be regarded merely as the bilateral 
problem between the Indonesians and the 
Dutch. For Sukarno, the issue was rather part 
of the international problems. As he stated in 
Los Angeles, “It is in the interests of the world 
not to let [the Dutch occupation in West Irian] 
continue.” “The colonial sword,” as he further 
stated, “was not only aimed at Indonesia, but it 
also threatens the world peace.” Sukarno even 
conveyed that Indonesia in dealing with the 
issue vowed to do everything in its power, 
including “confronting armed forces with 
armed forces, threats with threats.” In this, he 
emphasized that “the situation in West Irian is 
quite dangerous, an explosive condition, a 
cause of tension, and a threat to peace.” By 
portraying the West Irian issue as the one that 
could trigger an armed conflict between 
nations, Sukarno arguably attempted to attract 
wider international attention. He was 
particularly interested in attracting that of the 
United Nations, an international institution 
whose aim is at preserving the world peace. 
It can thus be seen that Sukarno sought 
to build a discourse through which Indonesia 
attempted to persuade as many as possible 
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members of  international community, 
especially the Asian–African nations, to take 
favorable stance on Indonesia’s interests on the 
issue of West Papua. The discursive strategy 
was directed to first promote solidarity among 
these formerly colonized nations and to 
convince them to join the collective struggle 
against colonialism. The issue of West Irian 
was then framed as the problem of colonialism, 
which was already portrayed as a source of 
international tension. Consequently, the issue 
was further depicted as part of international 
problems, rather than an issue solely between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. As such, 
Sukarno framed countries that took 
unfavorable attitude to Indonesia’s interests on 
the issue as the proponents of the practice of 
colonialism, and thus, the threats to the world 
peace. 
The following section describes 
Indonesia’s West Irian diplomacy in the period 
during which the discourse presented above 
predominated how Indonesian leaders thought 
about its foreign policy conduct. The 
description provides a context in which the 
need for such a foreign policy discourse would 
be more comprehensively understood. It was 
apparent that the need arose following the 
Indonesian great frustration over the lack of 
progress of their bilateral negotiation with the 
Dutch to solve the issue. 
 
 
Implementation of West Irian Diplomacy 
(1950-1963) 
The West Irian dispute was originated 
from the results of the Round Table 
Conference that took place in late 1949.8 The 
 
8 Central Intelligence Group, Basic Dutch- 
Indonesian Issues and Linggadjati Agreement, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DO 
C_0000256979.pdf [Accessed April 10, 2020]; 
Webster, David. “… SAMPAI MERAUKE”: the 
struggle for West Guinea, 1960–62. Master theses, 
University of British Columbia, 1999; Roadnight, 
Andrew. United States policy towards Indonesia in 
the Truman and Eisenhower years. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; Chauvel, Richard and 
Bhakti, I.R. The Papua conflict: Jakarta’s 
Dutch and the Indonesians agreed to give way 
to an immediate transfer of sovereignty from 
the former to the latter by excluding the 
territory from the process. In this, both parties 
decided to postpone the settlement of the status 
of territory. 
What then followed was prolonged 
bilateral negotiation between the Indonesians 
and the Dutch, because the latter was 
absolutely determined to maintain its 
sovereignty claim over West Irian. Therefore, 
no agreement was achieved, even three years 
after the Conference, despite both sides having 
committed–as stated in the Conference’s 
results–to settle their dispute over the territory 
within a period of only one year.9 
The lack of progress in the bilateral 
negotiations prompted a shift in the country’s 
strategy in dealing with the issue was highly 
desirable. The signs for changes then started to 
appear following the rise of Prime Minister Ali 
Sastroamijoyo to power in August 1953. 
Unlike his predecessors–the previous Prime 
Ministers Natsir, Sukiman, and Wilopo, Prime 
Minister Sastroamijoyo eventually decided to 
make use of the multilateral channels in trying 
to solve the West Irian dispute.10 The issue was 
then brought to international forums. As the 
nation celebrated the ninth anniversary of its 
independence, the Indonesian government 
formally submitted “The Question of West 
Irian” into the agenda of discussion at the 
Ninth UN General Assembly.11 
 
perceptions and policies. Washington, D.C.: East- 
West Center Washington, 2004. 
9 R. C. Bone Jr., The dynamics of the Western 
Guinea (Irian Barat) problem. New York: Cornell 
University Department of Far Eastern Studies 
Southeast Asia Program, 1958; Feith, Herbert. The 
Wilopo cabinet 1952 - 1953: a turning point in 
post-revolutionary Indonesia. Singapore: Equinox 
Publishing, 2009. 
10 N.M. Viviany, Australian Attitudes and Policies 
towards Indonesia, 1950 to 1965. PhD Diss., 
Australian National University, 1973; Leifer, 
Michael. Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
11 John Saltford, The United Nations and the 
Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962 – 1969: 
The anatomy of betrayal. London: Routledge- 
Curzon, 2003. 
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The debate over the status of West 
Irian began in November 1954, in the General 
Assembly’s First Committee that dealt with 
disarmament and international security. In this 
first attempt, Indonesia was particularly 
unsuccessful. It submitted a draft resolution 
that would ensure the UN's deep entanglement 
in the issue so that it would continue to deserve 
worldwide attention. No adequate support was 
shown for this draft in the Committee. An 
alternative draft that “did not go as far” as the 
initial draft proposed by Indonesia was then 
introduced.12 It merely expressed the hope that 
both parties would settle the dispute in 
accordance with the principles of the UN 
Charter, while at the same time requesting 
them to update the Assembly on the progress 
of the dispute settlement at its next session. 
Since such a compromise draft obtained 
adequate support, the Committee gave the draft 
its endorsement to be further discussed at the 
Assembly’s plenary session. It should  be 
noted, nevertheless, that the draft was 
eventually rejected by the Assembly, since it 
did not receive a two-thirds majority vote (see 
Table 1). 
As the table also indicates, the 
strongest support for a UN resolution on the 
Question of West Irian was shown by the 
Asian-Africa bloc. This, however, should not 
obscure the fact that their views on the issue 
differed from the ones of Indonesia, thereby 
making the Bloc’s support for the Indonesia’s 
interests was far from solid.13 India and Syria, 
for example, were among eight countries that 
submitted the aforementioned alternative draft 
resolution. Unlike Indonesia, they believed that 
the matter was bilateral in nature and the UN 
should remain away from the dispute 
settlement process. It turned out that such a 
draft was supported by the majority of Asian- 
African members. Seeking to prevent the Bloc 
from splitting up, Indonesia then withdrew its 
own draft resolution, which was submitted 




12 Colin Brown, Indonesia's West Irian Case in the 
UN General Assembly, 1954 (pp. 268). Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 7(3), 260-274. 1976. 
13 Ibid. 




Table 1. Voting Results on West Irian’s Issues in UN General Assembly (1954 – 1957) 
 
(The Blocs of) 
Countries 
Vote taken in UNGA’s Plenary Session14 
1954 1956 1957 
+ - A + - A + - A 
Asia-Africa 16 1 - 24 1 2 25 1 2 
Western 1 13 - 1 17 2 1 18 1 
Soviet 5 - - 8 - - 9 - - 
Latin America 10 7 3 6 6 7 5 9 6 
United States of America - - 1 - - 1 - - 1 
Others 1 2 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 33 23 4 40 25 13 41 29 11 
2
/3 Required Majority 40 53 55 








































14 The symbol “+” means in favor; “-“, against; and the word “A” means abstaining. 
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Moreover, the Bloc’s unity was 
challenged by Colombia’s proposal to amend 
the alternative draft. It argued that any 
UNGA’s resolution on the Question of West 
Irian should acknowledge the importance for 
the dispute settlement process to hear the 
voices of the territory’s inhabitants. To 
Indonesia, the enactment of such a resolution 
could be counterproductive to its interests on 
maintaining the country’s sovereignty claim 
over the territory. Indeed, Colombia’s proposal 
created dilemma for most of Asian-African 
states. While they were willing “to maintain 
their solidarity with Indonesia on the general 
question,” they also wanted to assert its anti- 
colonialist credential, “which had caused them 
to center their collective UN efforts on 
establishing the right of all dependent peoples 
to determine their own fate, free from outside 
interference.” 15 This time, however, most of 
Asian-African states opted for backing 
Indonesia up by rejecting the Colombia’s 
proposal. 
Indonesia’s efforts to promote Asian- 
African solidarity had in fact begun at the 
Colombo Conference in spring 1954. The 
Conference was originally planned to only 
include four former British colonies: Burma, 
Ceylon, India, and Pakistan. The host, Prime 
Minister Kotelawala, then extended the 
invitation to Indonesia, thanks to the  
suggestion from Prime Minister Nehru of 
India. 16 Besides discussing the issue of the 
atomic bomb, the situation in Indochina and 
Korea, as well as the status of the PRC at the 
UN, the Conference was also the place for 
these five Asian powers to express their anti- 
colonialist stances.17 This was while they were 
vocal in supporting the right of self- 
determination for nations that were still under 
colonial rule. Taking advantage of his presence 
 
15 Ibid., pp. 269. 
16 Cindy Ewing, The Colombo Powers: crafting 
diplomacy in the Third World and launching Afro- 
Asia at Bandung. Cold War History, 19 (1), 1-19, 
2018. doi: 10.1080/14682745.2018.1500553. 
17 I. J. The Colombo Conference: Neutrality the 
Keynote. The World Today, 10(7), 293-300, 1954. 
in Colombo, Indonesian Prime Minister 
Sastroamijoyo proposed to expand the 
Conference’s participants to also include the 
members of the UN from Asia-Africa Bloc. 
While Pakistan and Ceylon welcomed 
Indonesia’s proposal, India and Burma opined 
that such an idea might create antipathy to the 
Conference itself. 18 Following the visits of 
Prime Minister Sastroamijoyo to New Delhi 
and Rangoon in September 1954, Prime 
Minister Nehru and Prime Minister Nu 
declared their support for the idea to bring 
together Asia and African nations in a 
conference. 
The Colombo powers were regrouped 
in Bogor, Indonesia in December 1954. In this 
preparatory meeting for the Asian-African 
Conference, Prime Minister Sastroamijoyo 
reportedly insisted that condemnation of 
colonialism must be seen as one of the reasons 
for the gathering of these nations. 19 The 
discussion about the practices of colonialism 
that were still carried out in many Asian and 
African nations also led the attention of  the 
five prime ministers to the issue of West Irian. 
The Bogor Conference in turn became the 
place for the Colombo powers to express their 
support for Indonesia’s position on the issue. 
Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan 
even declared publicly his support, saying: 
“We strongly condemn colonialism wherever it 
exists and we sympathize with your attitude to 
the Irian question.”20 
Indonesia further exploited its position 
as the host of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference 
(AAC) to attract wider international attention 
on the issue of West Irian. President Sukarno 
did not waste the opportunity given to him to 
open the conference. Delivering his opening 
address before delegations from 29 nations, 
Sukarno was rather keen to emphasize more on 
the issue of colonialism, and the imperative of 
 
18 Cindy Ewing, The Colombo Powers. 
19 Ibid. 
20 B.D Arora, Pakistan’s role in Indian-Indonesian 
relations during the Soekarno era. International 
Studies, 14(2), 219-250, 1975. doi: 
10.1177/002088177501400202 
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anti-colonialism struggle, and the solidarity of 
Asia-African nations. For Cindy Ewing, 
“Sukarno was far more concerned with the 
ongoing dispute with the Netherlands over 
West Irian and emphasized the need to help 
liberation movements.”21 Indonesia can be seen 
as successful in gathering wider international 
support for its position in the issue. In the 
Conference’s  Final Communiqué,  two 
paragraphs were dedicated for the issue stating: 
The Asian-African Conference, in the 
context of its expressed attitude on the 
abolition of colonialism, supported the 
position of Indonesia in the case of 
West Irian based on the relevant 
agreements between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands. 
 
The Asian-African Conference urged 
the Netherlands Government to 
reopen negotiations as soon as 
possible, to implement their 
obligations under the above- 
mentioned agreements and expressed 
the earnest hope that the United 
Nations would assist the parties 
concerned in finding a peaceful 
solution to the dispute.22 
 
Covered by 400 foreign journalists, the 
AAC became the world’s spotlight and 
Indonesia gained a respectable place on the 
maps of world politics. 23 However, the real 
success that should be underlined was the 
success in gathering international public 
support to see the issue of West Irian from the 
framework of resistance movement against 
colonialism. Moreover, as seen in the excerpt 
of the Conference’s Final Communiqué above, 
the Conference even took favorable stances on 
Indonesia’s sovereignty claim on West Irian 
and the country’s effort to bring the UN into 
the dispute settlement process. 
 
21 Ibid. pp. 15. 
22 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
conference of Bandung (24 April 1955), accessed 
March 19, 2020, 
http://www.bandungspirit.org/IMG/pdf/Final_Com 
munique_Bandung_1955.pdf 
23 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. 
These positive outputs from the 
Bandung Conference brought about the 
impression that Indonesia would obtain better 
results from its endeavors in the UNGA in 
debates over West Irian. On 10 August 1955, 
Indonesia, together with Burma, India, 
Pakistan, and eleven other Asian-African 
countries, submitted a letter requesting that the 
question of West Irian should be discussed in 
the tenth session of the General Assembly. 
It should be noted, however, that a 
political change took place in Indonesia as 
Burhanuddin Harahap replaced Ali 
Sastroamijoyo as a prime minister. The former 
abandoned the latter’s anti-West polices to 
gather more support from the Western Bloc in 
the UN. He then pursued a policy of 
rapprochement with the Dutch, persuading 
them to return to the negotiating table. 
The Dutch initially responded to a 
policy like this with reluctance, especially 
because Indonesia was not willing to withdraw 
its request to the UNGA for the inclusion  of 
the issue of West Irian in the Assembly’s 
agenda. On 10 December 1955, however, 
Indonesia and the Netherlands resumed their 
bilateral talks. In light of this development, on 
December 12, India and Syria, together with 
three countries outside the Asia-Africa Bloc, 
submitted a joint draft resolution. The draft 
was designed to express the Assembly’s hopes 
that the dispute would be peacefully resolved 
and the negotiations between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands would be fruitful. The First 
Committee then unanimously accepted the 
draft, which was further approved by a plenary 
session with acclamation. 
Following another deadlock in Indo- 
Dutch bilateral negotiation, in October 1956, 
the Colombo powers and eleven other Asian- 
African countries again requested the UNGA 
to include the Question of West Irian in the 
agenda of its eleventh session. Thirteen 
countries, nine of which were Asian-African 
ones, sponsored a joint draft resolution 
requesting the UN Secretary-General to 
establish a committee of good offices and 
asking the committee to report back to the 
11 Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia | Sukarno and Colonialism: An Analysis of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Discourse, 1955- 
1961 
 
Assembly. This was proposed to ensure that 
the dispute could be settled peacefully. 
Unfortunately, this draft was not eventually 
adopted as the UNGA’s resolution as it failed 
to gather the minimum two-thirds of the vote 
(Table 1). 
An effort like this was repeated at the 
Twelfth UN General Assembly and it again 
failed. This time, 21 Asian-African countries 
asked the UNGA to include the Question of 
West Irian in its deliberations. A joint draft 
resolution was proposed requesting, among 
which, the UN Secretary-General itself “to 
assist the parties concerned, as he deems it 
appropriate, in the implementation of this 
resolution.” Despite the fact that Indonesia 
always had almost a full support from Asian- 
African nations, it was still unable to meet the 
required 2/3 majority for the UNGA to adopt a 
resolution (Table 1). Based on this result, 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio stated 
that the UN was not a suitable channel for 
resolving the issue of West Irian and that was 
Indonesia’s last endeavor to prompt the UNGA 
to adopt a resolution on the issue.24 
Indonesia’s constant failure at the UN 
and the deadlocks bilateral talks with the Dutch 
ultimately thrust Sukarno into the center stage 
as the dominant figure in the country’s overall 
effort to solve the issue of West Irian.25 The 
country then started to build massive military 
power, believing that diplomatic solution was 
no longer achievable. Missions were sent to the 
US and the Soviet Union to negotiate arms 
deals. While the White House until 1957 
rejected twice Indonesia’s requests, the 
Kremlin and the rest of Easter Bloc welcomed 
them.26 
 
24 Bone Jr., R.C. The Dynamics of the Western 
Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem. 
25 Richard Chauvel and I.R. Bhakti, The Papua 
conflict: Jakarta’s perceptions and policies; 
Lundry, Chris. Separatism and State Cohesion in 
Eastern Indonesia. PhD Diss., Arizona State 
University, 2009. 
26 Audrey Kahin, and Kahin, G.M. Subversion as 
foreign policy: The secret Eisenhower and Dulles 
debacle in Indonesia. Seattle, University of 
Washington Press, 1997. 
In response to the rapid flow of arms 
from the Eastern Bloc to Indonesia, the US 
President Dwight Eisenhower in December 
1958 agreed to provide military assistance 
valued at 15 million US dollars. By the end of 
1959, the total assistance from the Western 
Bloc countries had surpassed the value of 
assistance from the Eastern Bloc countries. 
However, a visit by the leader of Soviet Union, 
Nikita Khrushchev, in February 1960, which 
was followed by General Nasution’s mission to 
Moscow in 1961, after once again rejected by 
President Eisenhower, changed the balance. 
The accumulation of arms credits from the 
Soviet Union made Indonesia in 1962, the 
largest non-Communist country that received 
military assistance from the Eastern Bloc 
countries with a credit value of 1.5 billion US 
dollars.27 
Sukarno further upped the ante with 
his multilateral diplomatic maneuvers by 
bringing the issue of West Irian to the First 
Summit of Non-Aligned Movement. The 
meeting was held when Cold War tensions 
were escalating due to the Berlin Crisis and 
Soviet nuclear tests. Indonesia, nevertheless, 
tried to make the conference focusing on issues 
of territorial disputes that grew from 
colonialism, such as issues on Angola, Algeria, 
Congo, and West Irian. Sukarno, according to 
Frederick Bunnell, claimed that the source of 
world tension at that time was not in Berlin but 
in regions such as Angola and West Irian.28 
Indonesia’s presence in Belgrade 
attracted the attention of US press because of 
its role in initiating the AAC in Bandung six 
years earlier. The Times opined that Sukarno’s 
speech was quite surprising because he did not 
make any comment on the upcoming Soviet 
nuclear test, while his statement on the Berlin 
Crisis was clearly pro-Soviet.29 The Times, The 
 
27 W. A. Redfern, Sukarno’s guided democracy and 
takeovers of foreign companies in Indonesia in the 
1960s. PhD Diss., University of Michigan, 2010. 
28 F. P. Bunnell, American reactions to Indonesia’s 
role in the Belgrade conference. Singapore: 
Equinox Publishing, 2009. 
29 Ibid. 
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Post, and The Herald Tribune all noted that the 
main point conveyed by Sukarno in Belgrade 
was revolved around the importance of 
struggle against colonialism. Moreover, they 
also described Sukarno as a pro-communist 
and a militant anti-colonial activist. 
Sukarno’s efforts to involve the US in 
West Irian’s issue came to fruition when 
Indonesia received the support from the White 
House during the era of President John F. 
Kennedy. For Kennedy, the issue might 
complicate US position in Southeast Asia with 
regard to its relations with the Soviet Union, by 
adding another point of conflict besides 
Vietnam. 30 To prevent this from happening, 
President Kennedy appointed his younger 
brother, the US Attorney General, Robert 
Kennedy as a negotiator to facilitate the 
negotiation between Indonesians and the 
Dutch. In August 1962, the opposing parties 
finally met to sign an agreement in New York. 
Afterwards, the Dutch handed over the 
disputed territory to the United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on 
October 1, 1962. Then, on May 1, 1963, 
UNTEA turned West Irian to the Indonesian 
government. At that point, the diplomacy 
which took place for almost 14 years to bring 
West Irian to the Republic came to an end. 
 
Analysis 
The previous two sections have 
mapped the foreign policy discourse of 
Sukarno’s Indonesia and described the use of 
diplomacy, especially the multilateral one, to 
address the issue of West Irian. The promotion 
of the discourse at the global level and 
Indonesia’s foreign policy activism had 
positively contributed to Indonesia’s 
international standing. The country was 
therefore known as the leader of Asia-Africa, 
the staunch advocate of anti-colonialism 
struggle, and the champion of non-alignment. 
 
 
30 Pierre Van der Eng, Konfrontasi and Australia’s 
Aid to Indonesia during the 1960s. ANU College of 
Busines and Economics School of Management, 
Marketing and International Business, 2008. 
From the perspective of post- 
structuralism, foreign policy could also be can 
also be seen as a discursive tool utilized by 
states to claim power and authority. As such, 
through foreign policy, states attempt to create 
their own version of international politics, the 
one that would serve best its national interests. 
Based on this understanding, this study then 
seeks to show the ways in which the foreign 
policy discourse of Sukarno’s Indonesia was 
closely related to the ups and downs in the 
country’s efforts to address the issue of West 
Irian. 
Indonesia’s foreign policy activism 
only emerged after Jakarta decided to 
internationalize the issue of West Irian 
following the lack of progress in the 
negotiations with the Dutch from 1950 to 1953. 
The Indonesian government, by chance, did not 
have to wait too long to shift from bilateral to 
multilateral channels. It rode the wave of the 
efforts initiated to promote Asian Voice in the 
international discussions on Asian Affairs, 
which were realized through the 1954 Colombo 
Conference. Upon the invitation to this 
Conference, Indonesia did not waste the 
opportunity to propose the idea of expanding 
the Conference which included African nations 
that started gaining independence in the early 
1950s. Following some diplomatic efforts made 
by Prime Minister Sastroamijoyo and a follow- 
up conference in Bogor, a gathering of 29  
Asian and African nations could then be 
organized in Bandung. In this Conference, 
Indonesia, the host, took the advantage of the 
anti-colonialism sentiment already shared by 
Asian-African nations, attracting their support 
to the situation it faced as regard to the Dutch 
occupation in West Irian. 
Sukarno made the best of the 
opportunity given to him to deliver the opening 
address at the Bandung Conference by starting 
to promote a discourse, within which 
colonialism was put as a master signifier. 
Indonesia and Sukarno, as a postcolonial state 
and a former leader of  anti-colonialism 
struggle, had enough credential to exploit the 
word colonialism in the discourse they 
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promoted. Additionally, the discourse also fit 
best with the international audience before 
Sukarno at the Conference. The experience of 
being colonized was shared by most Asian and 
African nations, despite the differences they 
have in terms of culture, political system, or 
ideology. In this, the discourse was seemingly 
aimed at connecting as many as possible 
countries from these two different regions and 
further fostering solidarity among them. 
For post-structuralists, however, it is 
not the desire to promote anti-colonialism 
struggle per se that motivated Indonesia to put 
much efforts in realizing the Bandung 
Conference. It can also be said that fostering 
Asian-African solidarity was certainly not the 
end goal of Indonesia’s foreign policy activism 
during the Sukarno era. What were then the 
underlying interests that Sukarno’s Indonesia 
intended to ultimately serve by creating a 
foreign policy discourse that promoted anti- 
colonialism struggle, and thus, Asian-African 
unity? 
As described above, Indonesia started 
to put forward the idea to connect Asian and 
African nations only after it decided to bring 
the issue of West Irian to the UN.  A 
conference that facilitated direct exchanges 
among those countries was clearly needed 
particularly following Indonesia’s failure to 
mobilize complete support for its draft 
resolution on the issue of West Irian from the 
Asia Africa Bloc in UNGA’s ninth session in 
1954. Based on this, it is safe to argue that 
Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse was 
shaped by the country’s national interests on 
the issue of West Irian. The pressing need to 
mobilize supports from Asian-African 
countries in the voting process at the UN 
General Assembly as regard to the Question of 
West Irian was partly the reason why Indonesia 
went all out to organize not Asian-European or 
even Asian-American conferences but a 
conference specifically for Asian-African 
nations. 
West Irian diplomacy was concerned. The 
Final Communiqué of the conference included 
the statement of support from participating 
countries for Indonesia’s position on the issue. 
The conference even clearly took side with 
Indonesia by urging “the Netherlands 
Government to reopen negotiation as soon as 
possible”. Moreover, it also endorsed 
Indonesia’s view that it was necessary for the 
UN to intervene in this matter by stating: “[The 
Conference] expressed the earnest hope that 
the United Nations would assist the parties 
concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the 
dispute.” These statements indeed raised the 
Indonesians’ confidence that the Asian-African 
countries would stand behind Indonesia during 
the debates on the Question of West Irian at the 
UN. As Indonesia’s then foreign minister, 
Anak Agung Gde Agung described, 
In April 1955 the Bandung 
Conference of Asian and African 
nations had adopted a resolution 
supporting Indonesia’s national 
claim, making it apparent the Asian 
and African nations (with the 
probable exceptions of Turkey) 
would endorse a resolution at the 
General Assembly favoring 
Indonesia’s position.31 
 
In line with the Indonesians’ 
expectation, the Asia-Africa Conference was 
proved to have positive impacts on Indonesia’s 
West Irian diplomacy at the UN. At the ninth 
session of the General Assembly in 1954, 
Indonesia submitted on its own a draft 
resolution on the issue. In its first endeavor to 
turn the issue over to the UN, as described in 
the previous section, Indonesia even had to 
accept the fact that its proposed draft failed to 
attract complete support from the Asian- 
African states. In its subsequent endeavors 
from 1955 to 1957, nevertheless, Indonesia 
always had the supports of the Colombo 
powers and many other Asian-African 
In this, one could understand as well 
why Bandung Conference could be regarded as 
diplomatic victory for Indonesia as far as the 
 
 
31 Agung, Ida Anak Agung Gde. Twenty years 
Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965 (pp. 110). The 
Hague: Mouton, 1973. 
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processes since the very beginning of the 
process to make the issue discussed at the 
General Assembly. They jointly submitted 
draft resolutions that were consistently in favor 
of Indonesia’s position on the issue and further 
required the UN involvement in the dispute 
settlement between the Indonesians and the 
Dutch. 
Such an action eventually accentuated 
the international nature of the issue; it was not 
only Indonesia and the Netherlands that had 
concern over the issue but many other 
countries. In this context, one could understand 
the strategic value of Asian-African solidarity 
that Indonesia sought to promote. It helped the 
Indonesian government to present the issue of 
West Irian as the one that already created 
international concern, the one that the world 
had to pay attention to. As such, the UN 
involvement was then perceived as highly 
necessary. 
Indonesia’s active promotion of Asia- 
Africa solidarity through a foreign policy 
discourse in which colonialism was put as 
master signifier was carried out in parallel with 
a continued increase in the use of that word in 
literatures published in the 1950s to early 
1960s. The Bandung Conference, in which the 
foreign policy discourse was firstly introduced 
internationally by Sukarno, was held following 
the discussion on colonialism within 
international literature that had experienced a 
sharp increase (Figure 1). The figure below 
also shows that the culminating point of  the 
use of the word colonialism intersected with 
the moment when West Irian diplomacy 
concluded in the early 1960s. It is not the 
intention of this paper to claim that the 
substantial expansion in the discussion about 
colonialism was the function of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy activism in promoting Asian- 
African solidarity. The figure, nevertheless, 
shows that Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse 
was promoted when the issue of colonialism 
was drawing significant international attention. 
 
Figure 1. The use of the word colonialism in various literatures (1800 – 2000) 
 
Data were processed using Google Ngram Viewer, http://books.google.com/ngrams 
 
Sukarno’s Indonesia attempted to 
exploit this situation in which the issue of 
colonialism came under the international 
spotlight. This was particularly true after 
Indonesia experienced a series of setbacks 
during the voting at the eleventh and twelfth 
sessions of the General Assembly. The much- 
vaunted Asian-African solidarity indeed 
provided a positive contribution to Indonesia’s 
diplomacy; still, it was not enough to meet the 
required two-third majority votes. It was clear 
to Sukarno that Indonesia needed an additional 
approach to serve its national interests as 
regard to the issue of West Papua. 
He promoted an alternative discourse 
of inter-state relations without altering the 
position of colonialism as the master signifier. 
In his speeches in New York and Belgrade, 
Sukarno said that international relations must 
not be focused on the Cold War; rather, it must 
be focused on the issue of colonialism, instead. 
He further portrayed colonialism as a threat to 
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world peace. In this discourse, the issue of 
West Irian was represented as something 
bigger than a mere territorial dispute; it was 
characterized as a clear example of how the 
world was not completely free of the practices 
of colonialism. In so doing, Sukarno purposely 
endeavored to portray the issue of West Irian 
as a world problem, thereby attracting wider 
international support for Indonesia’s position 
on the issue. 
In the context of the Cold War, it can 
be said that the efforts to internationalize the 
issue of West Irian were made to also attract 
the involvement of the two superpowers in the 
dispute settlement. Seeking to gain more 
influence in struggle between the Western and 
the Eastern Blocs, the Soviet Union made 
calculated maneuver to take advantage of the 
situation. This was especially true after 
Sukarno had displayed a more militant attitude 
on the issue of West Irian. The superpower and 
other eastern bloc countries provided quite a 
significant arms support for Indonesia. This 
brought about an impression that Indonesia 
was part of the communist bloc, although the 
country clearly never formally joined the bloc. 
From the perspective of the 
geopolitical calculation during the Cold War, 
the US could not afford having a big military 
power like Indonesia to have the tendency to 
lean towards the communist bloc. For the 
Americans, the likelihood of an armed conflict 
between the Indonesians and the Dutch should 
be minimized since they were heavily 
preoccupied at that time with the  Vietnam 
War. After observing Sukarno’s militant 
statements in the Belgrade Conference, the 
White House was reportedly alarmed on the 
potential threat Indonesia might pose to the 
stability in Southeast Asia. 32 In his letter to 
President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, the US 
President’s Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, also said that the US stance 
that did not support Indonesia’s position on 
West Irian’s issue would only make the 
 
32 Bunnell, F. P. American reactions to Indonesia’s 
role in the Belgrade conference. 
situation more favorable for the Communists.33 
It can thus be seen that all these factors 
managed to draw the American significant 
involvement in efforts to settle the issue of 
West Irian.34 
The alternative discourse promoted by 
the Indonesians as they further 
internationalized the issue of West Irian 
seemingly provided positive contribution to 
Indonesia’s diplomacy in dealing with the 
issue. It played an important role in drawing 
the attention of the two superpowers. By not 
declaring itself in favor of one particular bloc, 
Indonesia even managed to gain supports from 
both blocs. The Soviet Union provided arm 
supports, while diplomatic support, which in 
turn made Indonesia succeed in claiming West 
Irian to the Republic, came from the US. 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of Sukarno’s Indonesia 
as one of the important players in international 
relations cannot be separated from the 
implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
to bring West Irian into the territory under the 
authority of the Republic. At the ideational 
level, Indonesia came up with a coherent and 
consistent foreign policy discourse, one which 
put colonialism as the master signifier. At the 
level of praxis, a discourse like this was 
translated into a foreign policy with a strong 
anti-colonialism nuance. This study has 
presented how the dynamics within these two 
realms were related to each other. It can thus 
be concluded that the foreign policy discourse 
firstly introduced at the Bandung Conference 
was aimed at serving Indonesia’s national 
interests as regard to the issue of West Irian. 
The promotion of Asian-African 
solidarity and the anti-colonialism sentiment 
 
33 Doran, Stuart. Western friends and Eastern 
neighbors: West New Guinea and Australian self- 
perception in relation to the United States, Britain 
and Southeast Asia, 1950-1962. PhD Diss., 
Australian National University, 1999. 
34 Anwar, D. F. The Cold War and Its Impact on 
Indonesia: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. In 
Lau, Albert (Ed.). Southeast Asia and The Cold 
War. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
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through the discourse must be understood as a 
means to mobilize supports from those 
countries so that Indonesia could gain a more 
favorable outcome in its efforts to turn the 
issue of the West Irian over to the UN. The 
foreign policy discourse was then further 
expanded to present an alternative reality of 
international relations at that time, in which the 
practice of colonialism, rather than the nuclear 
arms race between the superpowers, was 
represented as posing serious threats to 
international stability. A discourse like this was 
instrumental in drawing the involvement both 
the Soviet Union and the US in the dispute 
settlement process, as Indonesia further 
internationalized the issue of West Irian. As a 
result, the national interest to bring West Irian 
back into the fold of the Republic was well 
served, and moreover, Indonesia succeeded in 
enhancing its image, role, and leadership in 
world affairs. 
In the contemporary context of 
international politics, Indonesia is again re- 
emerging as a player of considerable 
important.35 Its active contribution at regional 
and global level has been widely 
acknowledged. The country is a member of the 
G-20 and it continues to maintain its leadership 
roles in ASEAN. Additionally, Indonesia is 
also the initiator of the Bali Democracy Forum 
and it took an active part in creating the 2015 
ASEAN Community. Under the leadership of 
President Joko Widodo, the country has been 
selected for the fourth time as a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. 
Demonstrating further its foreign policy 
activism, the country has made a great deal of 







35 See Laksmana, E. A. Indonesia’s rising regional 
and global profile: does size really matter? 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 23(2), 2011, 157– 
182, 2011 and Reid, Anthony (Ed.). Indonesia 
rising: The repositioning of Asia’s third giant. 
Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2012. 
that has later been adopted as the ASEAN 
outlook on the Indo-Pacific.36 
Sukarno’s Indonesia showed an 
example how national interests should rather 
be the starting point of any foreign policy 
activism. With the coherent and consistent 
foreign policy discourse, Sukarno was able to 
exploit the emergence of Indonesia as an 
important international actor at that time to 
serve Indonesia’s national interests. Indeed, it 
is a challenge for the current policy makers to 
bring forth a configuration of excellent and 
strong ideas and concepts, thereby enabling the 
country’s foreign policy to serve the national 
interests and provide positive contribution to 
the nation’s wellbeing in the future. As such, 
the current policymakers must emphasize that 
implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
and all its related activities and all the 
accompanying concepts are there to serve the 
national interests. 
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